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Abstract
We review the notion of perfect recall in the literature on interpreted
systems, game theory, and epistemic logic. In the context of Epistemic
Temporal Logic (ETL), we give a (to our knowledge) novel frame condition
for perfect recall, which is local and can straightforwardly be translated to
a defining formula in a language that only has next-step temporal operators.
This frame condition also gives rise to a complete axiomatization for S5
ETL frames with perfect recall. We then consider how to extend and
consolidate the notion of perfect recall in sub-S5 settings, where the various
notions discussed are no longer equivalent.
1 Introduction
Perfect recall is an epistemic-temporal notion concerning an agent’s ability to
remember the past. It does not entail that all knowledge an agent currently has
is preserved—in fact, certain (negative) knowledge must be lost as the agent
learns. For example “I know that I don’t know p” is lost when I learn p. Rather,
it means that an agent remembers all the information he once had, and can use
it to reason about the present.
The notion of perfect recall is well-studied in game theory (see, e.g., [14]
and [10, Section 11.1.3]) and in the distributed computing/interpreted sys-
tems/temporal logic literature [4, 19, 20, 8, 13] (see [6] for a discussion from the
viewpoint of the intersection of both). In recent years, it has also been discussed
in the epistemic logic community [16, 17, 18, 9], specifically in the context of
Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL) (see, e.g., [17]). ETL is an epistemic logic (or
rather, family of logics) with added event modalities, interpreted on tree models,
and it is intended to capture interactions of agents over time. Unlike with inter-
preted systems, the motivation is not dominated by the idea of processes with
control programs which govern their behavior into infinity, and therefore, ETL
does not necessarily aim at making statements about such long-term behavior.
Although the concept of histories (corresponding to runs in interpreted systems)
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does exist and variants of ETL with long-range operators such as “until” have
been studied, common ETL languages focus on the local perspective and lack
global temporal operators that can talk about indefinite time spans. In the
following, we use “ETL” in the narrow sense of epistemic temporal logic with
only next-step (local) temporal modalities.
Due to the differences between the mentioned frameworks, various definitions
and conditions for perfect recall exist. Our aim here is to review and examine
the relevant ones from the viewpoint of a logic without long-range temporal
operators. We use the history-based framework and notation of ETL (also used
by Parikh and Ramanujam [13]), but interpreted systems are for our purposes
essentially equivalent [11] and so our considerations should be transferable,
mutatis mutandis.
In synchronous settings (i.e., where agents have access to a global clock),
there is a well-known characterization of perfect recall, including a simple frame
condition and a definition that can be expressed in ETL. In contrast, without
synchronicity the existing characterizations of perfect recall seem to be inherently
global in the sense that they talk about whole (prefixes of) histories (or runs),
or refer to some arbitrary point in them. This precludes a direct translation into
a first-order frame condition (since reachability is not definable in first-order
logic) and also makes it unclear whether the notion can be expressed in ETL.
This is not an issue for the interpreted systems community, since they by default
have long-range temporal operators available.1 Indeed, van der Meyden [19]
axiomatized perfect recall using the “until” operator. However, this does not
transfer to logics which only have next-step temporal operators.
After briefly introducing ETL in Section 2 and discussing perfect recall
from the perspective of ETL in Section 3, we therefore in Section 4 propose
an alternative characterization of perfect recall which only uses single steps of
temporal (and epistemic) succession. We show that it is first-order definable
and definable in ETL, and we give a complete axiomatization for S5 ETL with
perfect recall. We then explore sub-S5 settings in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Epistemic-temporal logic (ETL)
We focus on the single-agent case since perfect recall is a property inherent to
one agent; all our considerations carry over to the multi-agent case. We consider
models over some finite set E of events. A history h ∈ E∗ is a finite sequence of
events, and we denote the empty history by . We denote sequences simply by
listing their elements, possibly preceded by a prefix sequence. For two histories
h, h′ we write h  e h′ if h′ = he, that is, if h′ extends h by one event e. We
write h h′ if h e h′ for some event e. We denote the transitive and reflexive
closure of  by  ∗, so h ∗ h′ says that h is a prefix of h′ (possibly h′ itself),
or vice versa, h′ is an extension of h. For h  ∗ h′, we sometimes also write
1It is not an issue for the game theory community because they do not commonly concern
themselves with formal languages.
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h  h′, and h ≺ h′ for h  h′ with h 6= h′. A protocol H ⊆ E∗ is a finite
set of histories closed under taking prefixes, intuitively representing the allowed
evolutions of the system.
An (epistemic) accessibility relation is a binary relation ∼ ⊆ H × H
on histories. It specifies, for any given history h, the histories that the agent
considers possible at h. Various conditions can be imposed on ∼, making it
capture various notions of knowledge or belief (for details see, e.g., [2]). Most
commonly, the relation is assumed to be an equivalence relation, making it
capture a notion of “correct knowledge”. This case is also referred to as S5. We
refer to less restrictive cases as sub-S5. Relevant properties include transitiv-
ity, reflecting positive introspection, and Euclideanness, reflecting negative
introspection. Another property is that of synchronicity, which intuitively
means that the agent has access to a clock. It holds if, whenever h ∼ h′, then
the lengths of h and h′ are equal.
An ETL frame is a tuple F = 〈E,H,∼〉 consisting of a set of events E, a
protocol H and an epistemic accessibility relation ∼. We will usually omit E
and H for the sake of clarity and implicitly assume that any events or histories
we talk about belong to E or H, respectively. An ETL frame can be viewed as a
temporal tree (induced by the relation) with epistemic accessibilities between
nodes. We will also consider an extension to forests, which are (finite) sets
of trees with distinct roots and possibly interrelating epistemic accessibilities.2
Most of our considerations apply both to trees and to forests, and only in
Section 5 we have to make the distinction explicit. We use properties of the
epistemic accessibility relation to specify frames with a corresponding relation;
for example, by an S5 frame we mean a frame with an S5 accessibility relation.
The language of ETL consists of a finite set At of propositional atoms and
of all formulas built from those according to the following grammar:
p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ | 〈e〉ϕ,
where p ∈ At and ϕ,ψ are formulas. Intuitively, Kϕ means that the agent knows
ϕ, and 〈e〉ϕ means that event e can occur and afterwards ϕ will hold. The
remaining propositional connectives are defined as abbreviations as usual, and
the duals of the modalities are denoted by L (dual of K) and [e] (dual of 〈e〉).
We write ♦ϕ to abbreviate
∨
e∈E〈e〉ϕ.
A valuation V : At→ 2H assigns to each atom the set of histories where it
is true. We write F , V, h |= ϕ for a frame F , a valuation V and a history h of
the protocol of F to say that ϕ is satisfied by F , V, h. Satisfaction of formulas
is defined inductively as usual, starting with the truth values of atoms as given
2The distinction between ETL frames and forests corresponds to the unique initial state
condition in the interpreted systems literature.
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by V , and with the following semantics:
F , V, h |= p iff h ∈ V (p)
F , V, h |= ¬ϕ iff F , V, h 6|= ϕ
F , V, h |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff F , V, h |= ϕ and F , V, h |= ψ
F , V, h |= Kϕ iff for each h′ ∈ H with h ∼ h′: F , V, h′ |= ϕ
F , V, h |= 〈e〉ϕ iff he ∈ H and F , V, he |= ϕ
A formula ϕ is said to be valid on F , V if and only if F , V, h |= ϕ for all h ∈ H.
It is said to be valid on F if and only if it is valid on F , V for all valuations V .
It is said to define a class C of frames if and only if it is valid exactly on the
frames in C.
For a binary relation R on histories we write [h]R = {h′ |hRh′} to denote
the image of h under R. If H is a set of histories, we write [H]R for
⋃
h∈H [h]R.
Obviously, if R is an equivalence relation, then [h]R is the equivalence class of h
with respect to R.
3 Perfect recall
In this section, we review existing definitions of perfect recall, give intuitive
justifications for the notions, and examine how they relate to each other.
Like in distributed systems, and unlike in game theory, in ETL there is no
notion of turns and no notion of agency associated with events. An event is
just an event and comes with no specification as to who performs it. In game
theory, turn-taking typically makes successive situations distinguishable and
perfect recall can often be formulated as “remembers all his actions”. In ETL,
these features are not part of the model3 and so we have to use other ways to
express the notion.
Whether or not time is part of the agent’s perception is exactly what makes
the difference between asynchronous and synchronous systems. Synchronicity
can be defined separately, if it is desired; we are interested in perfect recall as an
independent property, which does not interfere with (a)synchronicity, and thus
should not assume or imply that agents perceive time.
3.1 Basic definitions
We start by giving some intuition about the notions we are going to define.
As mentioned, an agent with perfect recall can at any point remember all the
information that he had at any previous point in time, and is able to exclude
any possibilities for the current state of the world which are inconsistent with
that information.
3Put differently, events may perfectly well be caused externally and go completely unnoticed
by any agent. If we do want to attribute certain events to certain agents (a view which
certainly suggests itself in the single-agent case, and is also customary in game theory), then
corresponding observability conditions for the agent performing a particular action can be
specified separately, and our definitions of perfect recall will not interfere.
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Two different intuitions for perfect recall There are two related ways
in which an agent might detect such inconsistencies, the first on the level of
epistemic states, and the second on the level of the semantic structures that
model them.4 Consider a perfect-recall agent in some state of the world, in ETL
terms a history, h, and some other history h′.
Firstly, if in state h′ the agent would have gone through a different sequence
of epistemic states than he actually has in h, then he can exclude the possibility
of h′, since he can recall all his epistemic states.
Secondly, if in the state before h the agent was certain that the world was
not in a state along history h′, then at h the agent can exclude the possibility
that the world is in state h′, since he can recall his previous assessments. Put
differently, if h′ is not an extension of some history considered possible before,
then the agent can exclude the possibility of h′ since there would have been no
way for the world to evolve to h.
We formalize these two intuitions in the following. As we will see, they are
equivalent in the context of S5, while in the general case, neither implies the
other (see Section 5).
Formalizing the intuitions The first notion is the one most commonly used
as starting point in the literature. It uses the idea of local-state sequences, or
“epistemic experiences”, meaning sequences of epistemic states that the agent
has gone through. Repetitions of identical states are ignored, since the agent
has no way of discriminating between two states in which he has the same
epistemic state. As in game theory (cf. [10, Section 11.1.3]), we identify an
agent’s epistemic state with his information set, i.e., the set of accessible worlds.
Definition 3.1. Given an ETL frame and a history e1 . . . e`, the agent’s epis-
temic experience is the sequence
EE(e1 . . . e`) := []∼ [e1]∼ [e1e2]∼ . . . [e1 . . . e`]∼
of epistemic states (or information sets, in game theory parlance) he has gone
through.
We say that the epistemic experiences in two histories h, h′ are equivalent
modulo stutterings, in symbols EE(h) ≈ EE(h′), if and only if the sequences
with all repetitions of subsequent identical sets removed are equivalent.
An ETL frame has perfect recall with respect to epistemic experience
(PRee) if and only if, whenever h ∼ h′, we have EE(h) ≈ EE(h′).
The second definition is a slight (but equivalent) variant of a notion most
commonly used in the interpreted systems literature.5 In the literature it has
been mostly used as a technical condition characterizing PRee, but by rephrasing
it we can provide it with an independent motivation.
4See Section 6 for some discussion related to the question of which aspects of the model an
agent can access.
5See [7, p. 204] (who call perfect recall “no forgetting”) and [19, Proposition 2.1(a)].
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Definition 3.2. An ETL frame has perfect recall with respect to history
consistency (PRhc) if and only if for any histories h, h
′ and event e with he ∼ h′,
there is some history h′′ with h ∼ h′′  ∗ h′ (i.e., some prefix of h′ is epistemically
accessible from h).
Put differently, the condition is that for each history h and event e, we have
[he]∼ ⊆ [[h]∼] ∗ .
This second formulation suggests an intuitive reading: A frame has PRhc
if all histories considered possible after some event are extensions of histories
considered possible before the event.
We refine this notion in Section 4 to obtain one that is more fine-grained and
detects more inconsistencies in sub-S5 settings; however, in the context of S5
the notions are equivalent, so for simplicity we stick with this definition for now.
There are two further related conditions in the literature, which we will state
next.
Definition 3.3 (cf. [20, 18]). An ETL frame has synchronous perfect recall
(sPR) if and only if for each h, h′, e with he ∼ h′ there is h′′ with h ∼ h′′  h′.
Put differently, the condition is that for each history h and event e, we have
[he]∼ ⊆ [[h]∼] .
That is, all histories considered possible after some event are extensions of
histories considered possible before the event by exactly one event.
Definition 3.4 (cf. [18, p. 503, Definition 11]). An ETL frame has weak
synchronous perfect recall (wsPR) if and only if for all h, h′, e, e′ with he ∼
h′e′, we have h ∼ h′. Put differently, for each history h and event e we have
[he]∼ ⊆ [[h]∼] ∪ {} .
It seems difficult to find an intuitive justification for this last definition: Why
should an agent with perfect recall be characterized to consider possible, after
some event, one-step extensions of histories previously considered possible or the
empty history? In order to get a better understanding of the various notions, we
now take a closer look at how they relate.
3.2 Relating the notions
First of all, as mentioned above, the two notions of PRee and PRhc are equivalent
in S5.
Proposition 3.5. An S5 ETL frame has PRee if and only if it has PRhc.
Proof. This follows immediately from [19, Proposition 2.1], instantiating what
the interpreted systems literature calls “local states” by the set of accessible
worlds in ETL frames.
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To give a version of the proof, we consider two histories and show that the
conditions of PRee and PRhc are equivalent. We first show that PRee implies
PRhc. For two empty histories this is obvious, so w.l.o.g. we assume that the
first history is non-empty. So assume that PRee holds and that he ∼ h′. We
have either of two cases:
(i) [h]∼ = [he]∼. But then h ∼ h′, and PRhc is satisfied.
(ii) [h]∼ 6= [he]∼. By PRee, we must have EE(he) ≈ EE(h′), and thus there
must be h′′  h′ with [h]∼ = [h′′]∼. So again, PRhc is satisfied.
To see that PRhc implies PRee, we proceed by induction on the sum of the lengths
of the two histories. The base case with both empty is straightforward. For
the induction step, assume that PRhc holds. W.l.o.g. we assume that the first
history is non-empty, so we consider he and h′ for some event e, with he ∼ h′.
PRhc yields one of two cases:
(i) h ∼ h′. Then the induction hypothesis yields EE(h) ≈ EE(h′). Further-
more, we have [h]∼ = [h′]∼ = [he]∼, so EE(h) ≈ EE(he). Taken together,
we obtain EE(he) ≈ EE(h′), and PRee is satisfied.
(ii) h ∼ h′′ for some h′′ ≺ h′. It then follows that h′ is non-empty. Let g be
its direct predecessor, i.e., g  h′. From h′ ∼ he, with PRhc it follows
that there is h′′′  he such that g ∼ h′′′. If h′′′ = he, then PRee follows
analogously as in the previous case. Otherwise we have h′′′  h. The
induction hypothesis yields EE(h) ≈ EE(h′′) as well as EE(g) ≈ EE(h′′′).
Since h′′  g and h′′′  h, we must have EE(h) ≈ EE(g). Since h he and
g  h′, together with [he]∼ = [h′]∼ we obtain that EE(he) ≈ EE(h′).
As we see in the following, the remaining two notions, sPR and wsPR, are
similar to these but impact another property, namely that of synchronicity. PRee
and PRhc, on the other hand, do not interfere with synchronicity. In agreement
with the interpreted systems and game theory literature, we therefore use them
as fundamental definitions of perfect recall in the context of S5, and due to their
equivalence, we use perfect recall (PR) to refer to both.
In the presence of synchronicity, not surprisingly, all notions are equivalent.
Proposition 3.6. On synchronous S5 ETL frames, all of the above notions
(PRee, PRhc, sPR, wsPR) are equivalent.
Proof. Straightfoward with Proposition 3.5; see also [8, 20].
It is easy to see that sPR implies synchronicity, since  is well-founded.6
Therefore, in general on S5 frames, sPR is equivalent to PR plus synchronicity.
As for wsPR, the relationship is a bit less clear-cut.
6One formulation of sPR is (cf. Proposition 3.9): “If the agent knows that at the next time
point p holds, then at the next time point he knows that p holds.” Intuitively this implies that
the mere ticking of the clock affects the agent’s mental state.
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e3
e1
e3
e2
(a) PR, but not
wsPR
e1 e2
(b) wsPR, but not
PR
Figure 1: Two frames, gray lines indicating information sets. (a) wsPR is
incomplete with respect to PR (wsPR is violated because e1e3 ∼ e2e3 but e1 6∼ e2),
and (b) wsPR is not sound with respect to PR on ETL forests: Intuitively, event
e1 lets the agent “forget” that he is in the left tree. Note that on forests the
definition of wsPR has to be adjusted by replacing {} by the set of all roots.
Proposition 3.7. On S5 ETL frames, wsPR implies PR, but not vice versa.
Put differently, wsPR is sound but incomplete with respect to PR.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward; for incompleteness, see Figure 1(a).
In that sense, wsPR is “somewhere in between” sPR and PR: It is strictly
implied7 by sPR and strictly implies PR. What distinguishes wsPR is that, while
it (unlike sPR) does not imply synchronicity, it does (unlike PR) presuppose it,
in that it fails to classify asynchronous frames correctly—given that, as we have
argued, PR captures the intuition of perfect recall as an independent property.
We therefore neglect wsPR in the further discussion: Synchronous perfect recall
frames are naturally captured by sPR and asynchronous ones by PR, while wsPR
has no clear domain of application in our context.
Remark 3.8. Except where noted, all our considerations carry over to ETL
forests (sets of ETL frames with possibly interrelating indistinguishabilities).
The first such note is the fact that on forests, wsPR is not only incomplete with
respect to PR but also not sound, as shown in Figure 1(b).
Note that the “local histories” of Parikh and Ramanujam [13] give rise
to frames in which exactly those histories are indistinguishable in which the
epistemic experiences are equivalent modulo stutterings, so that their frames
inherently satisfy PR.8 The version used by Pacuit et al. [12] analogously
produces frames which inherently satisfy sPR (and thus synchronicity).
Finally, we note that sPR is definable in ETL in a neat way, which also gives
rise to an axiomatization.
7By this we mean “implies, but is not equivalent to”.
8In fact, the frames they obtain are exactly those S5 frames which satisfy PR and a “fixed
observability” condition stating that, for each agent, there is a fixed set of events whose
occurrence he is able to distinguish from the (non-)occurrence of others.
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Proposition 3.9. An S5 ETL frame has sPR if and only if it validates the
following formula:
♦Lp→ L♦p
Together with S5, this axiomatizes ETL on synchronous S5 frames with perfect
recall.
This result is well-known and is analogous to [20, Theorem 4] and [8, Theo-
rem 3.6], since sPR characterizes synchronous frames with perfect recall.9 It can
be proved using Sahlqvist [15], similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4.
A corresponding characterization of PR has been given by van der Meyden
[19], but that characterization uses the “until” operator. To our knowledge, a
version using only “short-sighted” next-step temporal modalities has not been
discussed. Providing it is the aim of the next section.
4 Defining perfect recall in ETL
We start by giving a “local” version of perfect recall with respect to history
consistency, whose intuitive interpretation gives a more fine-grained account of
the agent’s possibilities for reasoning than PRhc does. As we will see in Section 5,
in general the notions are not equivalent, and the fine-grainedness of the version
we propose indeed makes a difference. In the current section, however, we show
that in the context of S5 this definition is equivalent to the preceding ones,
and we exploit its locality to find an axiomatization of perfect recall using only
next-step temporal modalities.
Definition 4.1. An ETL frame has PRhc, local version (PR
`
hc) if and only if
for each history h and event e, we have
[he]∼ ⊆ [h]∼ ∪ [[h]∼] ∪ [[he]∼] 
Put differently, for each h, h′, e with he ∼ h′, either of the following holds:
(i) h ∼ h′
(ii) h ∼ h′′  h′ for some h′′
(iii) he ∼ h′′  h′ for some h′′.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of this definition. Let us walk through it and
compare it with PRhc. We consider the history he and refer to h as “before e”
and to he as “after e”. The definition says that any history considered possible
after e either
(i) was considered possible already before e, i.e., the agent didn’t notice e, nor
time passing; or
9Compare also the Cross Axiom of Dabrowski et al. [3].
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hhe
e
h′
if he ∼ h′, then
h
he
e
h′
(i) h ∼ h′, or
h
he
e
h′′
h′
(ii) h ∼ h′′  h′, or
h
he
e
h′′
h′
(iii) he ∼ h′′  h′
Figure 2: Illustrating PR`hc. Gray, bent arrows indicate accessibilities, showing
the directed versions for the sake of illustration.
h
he
h′′
h′
e
(a) PRhc
h
he h′
e
(b) PR`hc
Figure 3: PR`hc inductively bridges the gap to PRhc, but it imposes additional
conditions on the intermediate states. However, in S5 the two conditions are
equivalent.
(ii) is an extension by one event of a history considered possible before e, i.e.,
the agent correctly thinks one event occurred, though he may not be certain
which one; or
(iii) is an extension by one event of another history considered possible after e.
As illustrated in Figure 3, this last condition inductively bridges the gap to PRhc,
and allows the agent to consider possible that several events occur while really
just e is happening. The difference, as compared to PRhc, is that now there is
a stricter consistency requirement. If the agent considers possible that several
events have happened, he must obviously be unable to detect some of them,
since really just one event happened. Given that, he must also consider possible
the intermediate histories along these several events—either from the history
after e or from before e. Exactly this consistency requirement is inductively
captured by the last condition (in interplay with the second condition).
Intuitively it is thus clear that PR`hc is at least as strong a condition as PRhc,
as formalized in the next result.
Lemma 4.2. Any ETL frame that has PR`hc also has PRhc.
Proof. A simple induction on the length of h′ in the definition of PR`hc proves
the claim.
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In Section 5 we will see that PR`hc is in general strictly stronger than PRhc; and
in particular in Figure 4 that it detects situations where (intuitively) information
is lost, for which PRhc fails to do so. However, in the context of S5, the notions
are in fact equivalent.
Proposition 4.3. An S5 ETL frame has PR if and only if it has PR`hc.
Proof. Recall that we use PR to refer to PRhc and/or PRee, since they are
equivalent according to Proposition 3.5. PR`hc implies PRhc by Lemma 4.2. Vice
versa, a simple induction on the length of h′ shows that PRhc and PRee imply
PR`hc.
Thus, in the context of S5, PR`hc is equivalent to the “established” notions
and we can use it to characterize perfect recall frames.
Theorem 4.4. An ETL frame has PR`hc if and only if it validates the following
formula for each event e (recall that ♦ϕ abbreviates
∨
e′〈e′〉ϕ):
〈e〉Lp→ Lp ∨ L♦p ∨ 〈e〉L♦p . (?)
Together with the normal modal logic axioms and deduction rules, it is sound
and complete with respect to the class of ETL frames with PR`hc.
Proof. This follows from the Correspondence and Completeness theorems by
Sahlqvist [15]. In some more detail, note first that the formula as frame property
is equivalent to
Kp ∧Kp ∧ [e]Kp→ [e]Kp ,
where ϕ abbreviates
∧
e′ [e
′]ϕ. This is a Sahlqvist formula, so as an axiom it is
complete with respect to the class of frames it defines. To see what that class
is, we start from the second-order formulation of this frame property (for any
histories h, h′ and event e′ we write h  e′ h′ if and only if he′ = h′, and we
write h h′ if and only if h e′ h′ for some e′):
∀P∀h1
[ ∀h2(h1 ∼ h2 → Ph2)
∧ ∀h2∀h3(h1 ∼ h2  h3 → Ph3)
∧ ∀h2∀h3∀h4(h1  e h2 ∼ h3  h4 → Ph4)
]
→ ∀h2∀h3(h1  e h2 ∼ h3 → Ph3)
As Sahlqvist pointed out, since P does not occur negated in the consequent,
the minimal instantiation of P satisfying the antecedent yields an equivalent
first-order formula. This minimal instantiation can be read off as:
Ph := h1 ∼ h ∨ ∃h2(h1 ∼ h2  h) ∨ ∃h2∃h3(h1  e h2 ∼ h3  h) .
Since it satisfies the antecedent, we are left with the instantiated consequent:
∀h1∀h2∀h3
[
h1  e h2 ∼ h3 →
h1 ∼ h3
∨ ∃h4(h1 ∼ h4  h3)
∨ ∃h4∃h5(h1  e h4 ∼ h5  h3)
]
.
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Since there is at most one e-successor for any given history h (namely he), we
can replace h4 in the last disjunct by h2. It is then easy to see that this is
equivalent to PR`hc.
Corollary 4.5. An S5 ETL frame has PR if and only if it validates (?).
Proof. Immediate with Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 4.4.
We thus have an axiomatization of S5 ETL with perfect recall. However,
some of the results we used indeed depended on S5. If we give up S5, we have
to take a fresh look at certain issues, and that is the topic of the next section.
5 Sub-S5 settings
To our knowledge, perfect recall has only been considered in the context of S5 in
the literature, a likely reason being that both communities that have studied
the notion most (interpreted systems and game theory) virtually exclusively
consider S5 settings. However, it may make perfect sense, for example, to say of
a misinformed agent that he correctly remembers all information he has ever
had, even if that information itself is not correct. In this section, we explore
such settings of general ETL frames.
5.1 Preliminaries
We stick with the symmetric-looking symbol ∼ even when the relation is not
necessarily symmetric. Note that [h]∼ now does not necessarily contain h itself
anymore, but we have the following fact.
Fact 5.1. If ∼ is a transitive and Euclidean relation, then it is an equivalence
relation on [h]∼ for any h (cf. [5, Theorem 3.3]). Consequently, for any h, h′
with [h]∼ ∩ [h′]∼ 6= ∅, we have [h]∼ = [h′]∼.
Note that the motivation and justifications for the definitions of perfect recall
we gave did not assume S5 knowledge. Each of the notions captured a particular
way of not losing information, and they still make sense without S5. We therefore
take over the basic definitions without any change, but take a new look at how
they relate.
5.2 Contrasting the notions
First note that PR`hc still implies PRhc, since Lemma 4.2 did not assume S5.
However, without any assumptions about the frames, none of the other mutual
implications among PRhc, PR
`
hc and PRee remain. This is witnessed by Figure 4,
illustrating that epistemic experience and history consistency reflect two different
ways of remembering past information.
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e3
e1
e3
e2
(a) PRee, but not PRhc
nor PR`hc
e1 e2 e3
(b) PRhc and PR
`
hc, but
not PRee
e1
e3
e2
(c) PRhc and PR
`
hc,
but not PRee
e1
e3
e2
(d) PRhc, but not
PR`hc nor PRee
Figure 4: PRhc, PR
`
hc, and PRee compared on general ETL frames, gray arrows
depicting the accessibilities. PRhc is violated in (a) since e1e3 ∼ e2e3 but there
is no prefix of e2e3 that is accessible from e1. PRee is violated in (b) since
EE(e1) 6≈ EE(e2), and in (c) and (d) since EE(e1) 6≈ EE(e2e3). PR`hc is violated
in (d) since e1 ∼ e2e3 but  6∼ e2e3 and  6∼ e2 and e1 6∼ e2.
(a) An agent that only has perfect recall with respect to epistemic experience
may at some point be certain that a particular history can be excluded,
but later on “forget” this piece of information. In particular, at e1e3 the
agent considers e2e3 possible, even though he never considered e2 possible.
(b) and (c) An agent that only has perfect recall with respect to history consistency
may at some state consider another state possible, although in that other
state his epistemic experience would have been different. For example, an
agent at e1 in (c) is (mistakenly) certain that he is at e2e3, even though
in that state his previous information set would have been {e2}, which
contradicts his actual epistemic experience.
(d) The intuition is similar to the previous case, but here we see that PR`hc
is more fine-grained than PRhc. An agent at e1 thinks he is at e2e3, even
though he never considered e2 possible. He thus thinks himself at the
endpoint of a history whose unfolding he deemed impossible. PRhc grants
this agent the label of perfect recall, while PR`hc denies it.
Note that, while these phenomena reflect some kind “forgetting”, they do
not at first glance constitute a coherent, rational method of belief revision. A
full-fledged doxastic logic is needed in order to really model agents that reconsider
their previous assessments and deal with “unwanted” memories properly.
The following straightforward result enables us to identify the settings in
which the different notions of perfect recall can be meaningfully compared.
Proposition 5.2. Any ETL frame that has PRee is transitive and Euclidean.
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Proof. This is obvious from Definition 3.1. For example, for any three histories
h, h′, h′′, if h ∼ h′ and h ∼ h′′, then PRee implies that [h]∼ = [h′]∼ = [h′′]∼.
Since h′, h′′ ∈ [h]∼, we also get h′ ∈ [h′′]∼ and h′′ ∈ [h′]∼.
This result is not very surprising, given that PRee requires of an agent to be
able to assess his own epistemic experience—including at the current state. It
implies that any reflexive ETL frame with PRee is already an S5 ETL frame.
On the level of agents, an agent who has correct beliefs and PRee has in fact
already full (S5) knowledge. However, perfect recall does not require the agent to
have correct beliefs (in fact, perfect recall by itself is compatible with believing
falsum). For example, KD45 is a common sub-S5 setting in which perfect recall
is a meaningful notion.
Given that transitivity and Euclideanness are inherent to PRee, we continue
our comparison within the corresponding class of frames. In the following, we
use introspective to mean “transitive and Euclidean”.
5.3 Characterizing PRee locally
Given the fact that PR`hc no longer characterizes PRee and the original definition
of PRee is somewhat unwieldy, it can be useful to have a local condition on
histories and accessibilities that corresponds to it. It turns out that we can
re-use PR`hc by slightly modifying the frame in question.
For a frame F with accessibility relation ∼, we will use F˙ and ∼˙ to denote
the S5 closure. We need the following small technical condition: We say that
a frame satisfies persistent insanity if, whenever [h]∼ = ∅ and h  h′, then
[h′]∼ = ∅. Intuitively, once a corresponding agent has inconsistent beliefs, he
will remain in that pitiful condition forever.
Proposition 5.3. An introspective ETL frame satisfying persistent insanity has
PRee if and only if its S5 closure has PR
`
hc.
10
Proof. Due to Proposition 4.3, PRee and PR
`
hc are equivalent on the S5 closure.
We can thus prove the claim by showing that PRee is invariant under taking this
closure.
To see that this is indeed the case, take any pair h, h′ of histories, the
accessibility relation ∼ of an introspective frame satisfying persistent insanity,
and its S5 closure ∼˙. With Fact 5.1, it is easy to see that, as long as [h]∼ 6= ∅,
we have [h]∼ = [h′]∼ if and only if [h]∼˙ = [h′]∼˙. Inductively it follows that the
equivalence of epistemic experiences is invariant under taking the S5 closure as
long as [h]∼ 6= ∅; persistent insanity ensures that PRee is also satisfied for any h′
extending an h with [h]∼ = ∅.
To see that persistent insanity is indeed needed for this result, consider
Figure 4(a) with the accessibilities e2 ∼ e1 and e1 ∼ e1 removed. The resulting
frame still has PRee, but its S5 closure does not have PR
`
hc.
10 Note that this is indeed a local condition: On introspective frames the S5 closure is the
symmetric and reflexive closure, without any need of iterating through the accessibility relation
(cf. Fact 5.1).
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Corollary 5.4. A KD45 ETL frame has PRee if and only if its S5 closure has
PR`hc.
Proof. Immediate, since KD45 frames are introspective and vacuously satisfy
persistent insanity.
Remark 5.5. Note that PR`hc implies persistent insanity, so Proposition 5.3 applies
to all introspective frames with PR`hc.
As witnessed by Figure 4 and by Figure 5 later on, the notions PRee and
PR`hc are incomparable in the sense that each one is stronger than the other one
under certain circumstances. Proposition 5.3 gives an insight as to why this is so:
By applying the PR`hc condition to the S5 closure of a frame, on the one hand the
antecedent in this condition becomes more permissive, but on the other hand so
does the consequent. Thus, the condition gets both strengthened and weakened.
Now that we have contrasted our basic notions of perfect recall and provided
and discussed separate local characterizations, we proceed to characterize the
combination of the notions. We use PR to denote the combination of perfect recall
notions, PRee plus PR
`
hc (and thus PRhc), describing perfect-recall agents that
can reason both about their epistemic experience and about history consistency.
As mentioned earlier, our considerations so far hold both for ETL trees and
ETL forests. Now, however, the distinction becomes important. We start by
focusing on trees.
5.4 Characterizing PR on trees
It turns out that on introspective trees, PR`hc captures both definitions of perfect
recall, much like it (and PRhc) did on S5 frames. This allows us to define and
axiomatize PR on introspective trees, reusing the results we obtained in Section 4.
Theorem 5.6. An introspective ETL tree has PR if and only if it has PR`hc.
Note that this result is not in contradiction with the examples in Figure 4,
since (b) is not transitive and (c) is not Euclidean. For the proof, we need the
following auxiliary results.
Observation 5.7. For any introspective ETL frame with PR`hc and histories
h1, h2 with h1  h2 and h1 ∼ h2, for each h′1  h1 there is h′2  h2 such that
h′1 ∼ h′2.
Proof. The claim can be shown with a simple induction on h1, using Lemma 4.2
and transitivity of .
Lemma 5.8. For any introspective ETL frame with PR`hc and histories h1 and
h′2  h  h2, if h1 ∼ h2 and h1 ∼ h′2 then h1 ∼˙h.
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Proof. With Euclideanness, we obtain h2 ∼ h′2. Let h′′2 be the shortest prefix
of h2 such that h2 ∼ h′′2 (note that h′′2  h′2  h). Observation 5.7 implies that
there must be h′  h′′2 with h ∼ h′. Another application of Observation 5.7
then yields that there is h′′  h′ such that h′′2 ∼ h′′, and by transitivity we get
h2 ∼ h′′. Now if h′ ≺ h′′2 then h′′ ≺ h′′2 , contradicting that h′′2 is the shortest
prefix accessible from h2. So h
′ = h′′2 , thus h ∼ h′′2 . Since h1 ∼ h2 ∼ h′′2 , we
obtain the claim.
Lemma 5.9. If an introspective ETL tree has PR`hc, then so does its S5 closure.
Proof. Take any introspective tree F with PR`hc. To see that its S5 closure F˙
also has PR`hc, let h, e, h
′ be such that he ∼˙h′. We need to show that ∼˙ satisfies
one of the three conditions in the definition of PR`hc.
Since ∼˙ is the symmetric and reflexive closure of ∼ (cf. footnote 10), we have
either of these cases:
• he = h′. Since h ∼˙h, condition (ii) in the definition of PR`hc obtains.
• he ∼ h′. Since F has PR`hc, ∼ satisfies one of the three conditions of PR`hc,
thus so does ∼˙.
• h′ ∼ he. If h′ 6=  then the same argument as in the previous case applies.
Otherwise, h′ =  ∼ he. Euclideanness of ∼ yields he ∼ he, and since ∼
satisfies PR`hc, we have either of these three cases:
(i) h ∼ he. Since h′ ∼ he, we get h ∼˙h′, so ∼˙ satisfies condition (i) of
PR`hc.
(ii) h ∼ h. Since h′ =   h, Observation 5.7 yields that there is h′′  h
such that h′ ∼ h′′. Now we have h′ ∼ he, h′ ∼ h′′ and h′′  h  he,
so Lemma 5.8 applies and yields h′ ∼˙h. Symmetry of ∼˙ yields h ∼˙h′,
so ∼˙ satisfies condition (i) of PR`hc.
(iii) he ∼ h. Together with h′ ∼ he we get h′ ∼˙h. Symmetry of ∼˙ again
yields h ∼˙h′, condition (i) of PR`hc.
We can now straightforwardly prove the stated result.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. PR implies PR`hc by definition. To see that the reverse
direction holds, take any introspective ETL tree F that has PR`hc. Due to
Lemma 5.9, its S5 closure also has PR`hc, and with Proposition 5.3 and Remark 5.5
it follows that F also has PRee.
Since the proof of Theorem 4.4 did not use S5, we immediately obtain an
axiomatization of ETL on introspective trees with perfect recall. Further, it is
easy to see that on synchronous trees, sPR and PR`hc are still equivalent, so we
also have an axiomatization of ETL on synchronous introspective trees with
perfect recall.
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e1
(a) Forest F (two trees)
e1
(b) Forest F ′ (three trees)
Figure 5: (a) F is an introspective forest that has PR`hc, but not PRee. (b) F ′ has
PR`hc and PRee, and F is its bounded morphic image via the bounded morphism
depicted with dashed arrows. So PR is not modally definable on forests.
5.5 Characterizing PR on forests
Theorem 5.6 does not apply to forests, as witnessed by Figure 5(a). Before we
look at how to characterize PR here, we note that, unlike on S5 forests, defining
PR on introspective forests generally is impossible in ETL (the same holds for
PRee).
Proposition 5.10. PR is not modally definable on introspective ETL forests
(and thus not on general ETL forests either).
Proof. F ′ in Figure 5 has PR, while its bounded morphic image F does not.
Since modally definable properties are closed under bounded morphic images
(cf. [1]), the claim follows.
From Proposition 5.3 and Remark 5.5 it is clear that any introspective frame
has PR if and only if both it and its S5 closure have PR`hc. However, with an
additional slight restriction, we can continue to use PR`hc to characterize PR.
From Figure 5, it is intuitively clear that accessibilities from some root to a later
state in some (different) tree are problematic: In such cases, PR`hc is vacuously
satisfied, while PRee may not hold.
To fix this, call an ETL forest F initially synchronous if, for any two
roots , ′ and history h with   h and ′ ∼ h, we also have ′ ∼ . That is,
the agent at least considers it possible that indeed no time has passed initially,
although he may immediately lose synchronicity and also consider later states
possible. We then get the following.
Lemma 5.11. If an introspective and initially synchronous ETL forest has PR`hc,
then so does its S5 closure.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 5.9, with one additional ob-
servation: If ′ ∼ h for some history h with root , then initial synchronicity
yields ′ ∼ . Euclideanness then yields  ∼ h, and with Theorem 5.6 it fol-
lows that EE() ≈ EE(h). Due to Fact 5.1, we also have EE(′) ≈ EE(), so
EE(′) ≈ EE(h) by transitivity of ≈.
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Theorem 5.12. An introspective and initially synchronous ETL forest has PR
if and only if it has PR`hc.
Proof. Analogously to Theorem 5.6, this follows from Lemma 5.11, Proposi-
tion 5.3 and Remark 5.5.
6 Conclusions
We discussed two different ways of “not losing information”, that is, accessing
and reasoning with one’s memories. The first one has been the fundamental
definition in the literature on perfect recall. It assumes that a perfect-recall
agent can use differences in past epistemic states in order to distinguish present
states. The second one is a consistency condition on the histories considered
possible. While it has been used in the literature as technical condition, we
provided it with its own motivation.
The two notions have previously been studied in S5, where they coincide, and
in logics with long-range temporal operators. We gave a novel characterization
and axiomatization in ETL, using only next-step temporal operators.
We then dropped the assumption of S5 and noticed that the notions no longer
coincide. Since they capture two independently motivated ways of reasoning
with memories, we examined and characterized them individually as well as
jointly.
Given that the two notions use different aspects of ETL models, some
discussion is needed concerning the access that we assume an agent to have.
It is a general issue in modeling agents to what extent the model faithfully
represents an agent’s internal workings, and to what extent it represents the
modeler’s external perspective. What we mean if we say that an agent “does
not lose information”, of course, depends on what information we ascribe to him
in the first place. ETL is agnostic as to whether the agent has direct access
to the semantic structures constituting a model or whether they are just a
representation for the modeler, and whether the logic language is supposed to
reflect the agent’s “mentalese” or whether it is just a way for the modeler to talk
about the agent. Depending on the intended interpretation, one may exclude or
include certain features in what is considered the agent’s information, and one
may accept or reject certain methods for the agent to access and reason with his
memories.
Since ETL does not specify these issues, we simply examined what can be
said if the agent has access to certain aspects of the model. Outside of S5, where
the notions do not coincide, it depends on the modeled situation which definition
of perfect recall is the right one.
An interesting question for further research is whether there are additional
aspects of reasoning with memories, which might be conflated in S5 with the
ones we discussed, but distinct in other settings.
The general goal with these considerations is to help improve our under-
standing of the assumptions implicit in the framework or explicitly made by the
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modeler when modeling agents. Along the lines of the inspiring work by van
Benthem et al. [18], we hope to obtain more fine-grained insights in more general
settings.
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